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IN

The Supreme Court
OF THE

State of Utah
OSCAR W. MOYLE and
MAY P. MOYLE,

Plaintiffs and Respondents,

vs.

Case No. 6328

SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal
corporation,

Defendant and Appellant.
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The present action of Oscar W. Moyle and May P.
Moyle aga~st Salt Lake City grows out of a special proceeding instituted by Salt Lake City as plaintiff and
Oscar W. Moyle and May P. Moyle as defendants filed
in the District Court of the Third Judicial District for
Salt Lake County, Utah, early in July, 1926. To that
complaint the Moyles interposed a general and special
demurrers. Those special proceedings may possibly be
referred to as condemnation proceedings or intended as
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such, but they were peculiar in nature and certainly
were sui generis. The City claimed that by reason of a
jam they were in under a contract with 'the Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Company it was necessary that the
City acquire the water rights owned by the Moyles and
which waters the Moyles diverted through the Tanner
Ditch. This water was not water of the Big Cottonwood
Tanner Ditch Company but water owned by the Moyles
otherwise than as stockholders in said Company and the
Moyles used the Tanner Ditch as a tenant in common
with the Company in the ownership of the Tanner Ditch
or at least as such tenant in common for that portion of
the Ditch located on and above the :Moyle property.
On those proceedings and on July 23, 1926, on motion of Salt Lake City, the Court ordered that Salt Lake
City "is hereby authorized to take all the water of Big
Cottonwood Creek now flowing in Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch and to turn into said Big Cottonwood Tanner
Ditch other water suitable for irrigation in lieu and place
of Big Cottonwood Creek water so taken therefrom by
plaintiff, and it is further ordered that as soon as possible plaintiff shall in water pipes furnish or make available for defendants for domestic and culinary purposes
sufficient water from Big Cottonwood Creek.'' The City
in its complaint had alleged that the other waters to be
turned into the Tanner Ditch were Utah Lake waters,
not potable but fit for irrigation while the Big Cottonwood waters were potable.
The case rested in the District Court until the deSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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murrer of the ~Ioylt•s was noticed Oct. 2, 1937, for hearing, duly argued, and the general demurrer of the :Moyles
was sustained and on Jan. 7, 1938, and on motion of the
plaintiff therein, (Salt Lake City) and without notice
to the ~Ioyles, the Court ordered the case dismissed.
\Yhether the Court in that case erred in sustaining the
demurrer or in granting the order of possession of the
water we submit is wholly immaterial to the present
action. The Court had jurisdiction of the subject matter,
of the parties, and of the special proceedings, and there
was no appeal by the City.
The present action was brought by the Moyles
against the City to recover the reasonable value of the
use and possession of the water so taken under the order
of July 23, 1926, from the time of such taking and also
for the return of the waters to the plaintiffs (Moyles)
herein and alleged their damages for the taking and withholding of the ,,~a ter in the sum of $4150.00 ( Abs. p. 3).
The Defendant herein, Salt Lake City about one-half
dozen times has repeated in its brief that counsel fo1·
the l\foyles in open court disclaimed any damages to
the plaintiffs. This, of course, is not correct. No counsel
for plaintiffs ever at any time disclaimed any damages
to the plaintiffs. What was said by counsel was that
we were not claiming special damages but only general
damages as set out in the complaint. See appellants
brief pp. 15-24-27 and Abs. 148 and other places throughout the brief of appellants.
The l\[ oyles in addition to the water involved in this
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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litigation owned stock in the Big Cottonwood Tanner
Ditch Company during all the time since July 1926, and
for some time before. It will be necessary for the Court
to keep this in mind all the time while reading the testimony in this case. They owned something over 23 shares
in the Corporation and were entitled as such stockholders
to use the water represented by such shares. That water
and the use thereof is not involved in this case but it is
frequently referred to in the evidence. The water involved in this case is described as 22% shares of water
right in the Tanner Ditch (not in the Corporation) and
the water right was appurtenant to land owned by the
Moyles in the SE14 of Sec. 15, T 2 S, R 1 E, S. L. :M.
in Salt Lake County. The water diverted by the Tanner
Ditch is described as 1860 shares of which the Moyles
own 2234 shares for use during the entire year; other
independant owners own about 227 shares and the Big
Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Company owns substantially
1625 shares of the water so diverted. (Abs. 104 to 112).
The figures do not quite reconcile but that is immaterial
here. The fact to lmep in mind is that Moyle owned two
water rights, one by virtue of his ownership of stock
in the Corporation and the other (the one involved here)
by ownership of a water right appurtenant to his land.
Another fact to keep in mind to determine the weight
to he given the witnesses on the question of value of the
use of the water taken by the City is the place on the
Tanner Ditch that the witnesses reside. The Moyles
reside and took their water from the upper end of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Tanner Ditch and only a short distance below its intake
at the Big Cottonwood Creek. The \Yater there was a
large stream running only a short distance in the Tanner
Ditch and Yery desirable for household purposes. Realizing this, the :J[oyles refused to participate in the organization of the Corporation and refused to transfer their
water rights in the Tanner Ditch to the Corporation.
The people one to three miles further west more generally participated in the organization of the Corporation
and transferred their water right or at least the control
of it to the Corporation. When the City and the Corporation were negotiating the exchange agreement by which
Utah Lake water from the City Canal was to be pumped
into Cottonwood Creek bed and to be delivered to the
Tanner Ditch at its intake, the 1\Ioyles, as stockholders
of the Corporation, and some others on the upper part
of the Tanner Ditch opposed the entering into of the exchange agreement by the Corporation. But the water
users far down the Tanner Ditch had to conduct the
water a long distance in the Tanner Ditch and very often
a long distance in ordinary private irrigation ditches
carrying only a small stream of water and such water
was not desirable for household purposes. Those people
were farming people and wanted irrigation water and
for this purpose Utah Lake water was practically as good
as Big Cottonwood Creek water and piped water for
culinary purposes was most persuasive to them and they
therefore desired the Corporation to enter into the exchange agreement. These facts enter in a large way into
the attitude and opinion of the witnesses for Salt Lake
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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City on the question of the value of the use of the water
taken by Salt Lake City and their opinions are all on
the theory that Utah Lake water is just as valuable as
Big Cottonwood stream water; in most instances, however, those witnesses expressed no opinion whatever on
the value of Big Cottonwood stream water but only upon
the value of any kind of water for irrigation.
Prior to the order for immediate possession of the
water in question Moyle put to a beneficial use the entire
amount of water he was entitled to use under his ownership of the 22%~: shares in question and also under his
ownership of shares in the Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch
Company. Abs. 29-30. After the order of possession,
July 23, 1926, he used no part of the water owned by him
and represented by the 223A, shares not represented by
stock in the Corporation but used only the water allotted
to him on his shares of stock in the Big Cottonwood
Tanner Ditch Corporation. Abs. 32-3; also Abs. 55-'6. In
1926, and frequently since 1926 during the dry season
Salt Lake City has diverted at the City's conduit the
entire flow of Big Cottonwood stream and all the water
entering the Tanner Ditch at those times is Jordan River
water. At other times during the dry season the water
entering the Tanner Ditch is a mixture of Big Cottonwood stream water and pumped Jordan River water and
at all such times there is no water in the Tanner Ditch
fit for culinary purposes; that has been the case continously since 19~6 to the time of the trial ( Abs. 30-31.)
Prior to the pumping by the City, the water in the Tanner
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Ditch was clear Big Cottonwood water fit for culinary
purposes. ( Abs. 31.)
Prior to 1926, when the water was taken by the
City, :Jioyle used the Tanner Ditch as a tenant in common
with the Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Company as far
down as he diYerted the ·water described as 22% shares
from the Tanner Ditch. Because of that common use he
paid to the Corporation each year an amount agreed
upon as his share as such tenant in common of the upkeep
of the Tanner Ditch. \Yhen the City took the water in
1926 shortly thereafter :Moyle notified the Company he
would not pay any such upkeep because he did not have
the possession of the water as it was taken from him
by the City.
See Exhibit I, ~Ir. :\Ioyle's letter to Amos H. Turner,
Secretary of Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Company,
dated February 20, 1931, wherein he stated:
"When you were in my office the other day
and went over the items of expense constituting
this $1.64 per share. I considered them reasonable,
and as far as that is concerned, think they are a
reasonable charge to be made for the 22%~: shares
of stock and I would be glad to pay the total
$38.41, which you requested if it were not for the
fact that Salt Lake City has condemned this water
right. Going over my files I find my letter of
July 31, 192G directed to Big Cottonwood Tanner
Ditch Co., Amos H. Turner, Sec., R.D. 3, Murray,
Utah, a copy of which I inclose. The Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. ought to receive this
money but as stated in the inclosed letter, Salt
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Lake City was given possession of this water right
in July 1926 and since that time, having the possession of the water, should pay the assessment."
Also, in a letter dated September 12, 1933, to Irvin
T. Nelson, Treasurer of Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch
Company, Mr. Moyle wrote as follows:
''I can only inform you, as I have heretofore
informed you each year as you send the statement,
that Salt Lake City brought condemnation proceedings against this water several years ago,
took possession of it, and has had the use and
benefit of it ever since. I am not entitled to it, am
not using it, and will not pay any upkeep ur any
expense whatever, and I do not understand why
you continue to send me these yearly statements,
since, as stated, the water does not belong to me
and has not been used by me. I do not know what
Salt Lake City is doing with it, that is a matter
between you and the City." (Exhibit J.)
Also, to the same effect, see Exhibit K.
Nevertheless the watermaster of the Company continued to issue to Moyle cards allotting to him the full
amount of water represented by the 22%, shares involved
herein. But the testimony of Moyle is positive that not
withstanding such allotment cards he used only the water
represented by the 23+ shares of corporate stock, and
used no part of the water right represented by the 22%,
shares not in the Corporation. Abs. 56.
The reasonable value of the use of the water taken
by the City from the time of its taking until the time of
trial was at least $15.00 per share per annum; this was
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the testimony of ~fr. :Moyle and was the lowest estimate by any witness in the case; other witnesses fixed
its value at $50.00 per share per annum; and in a controversy between Salt Lake City and the Moyles before
the State Engineer, the State Engineer found that the
value of Big Cottonwood stream water in the vicinity
of Moyle's place was ten times the value of Jordan River
water delivered at the same place. Plaintiffs' position
is that there is no evidence offered by defendant contradicting the evidence on the question of damages.
On pages 7, 8 and 9 of Appellants brief counsel has
listed nine questions, lettered A to I inclusive, which he
states are involved in this appeal. Six of these questions
which are set out in full bel'ow, we submit are not involved
in this appeal at all as there is no evidence on any such
questions at all. These six questions are:
Appellants question B: Can the plaintiffs recover
a judgment for damages in any sum other than nominal
damages without proving that damages have been suffered 1
Appellants question C: Can the plaintiffs waive a
tort and sue on the implied contract and recover the reasonable rental value of a water right where the water
has never been reduced to possessi'On by the plaintiffs 1
Appellants question D : 11ay you prove damages
for the reasonable rental value of property by proving
that the plaintiff believes that the property could have
been sold for some stated amount and that the proceeds
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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from the sale could be loaned at a rate of interest that
would appear satisfactory to the plaintiffs and then take
the yield from that multiplication or computation as the
reasonable rental value~

Ap,pellants question E: May the plaintiffs prove a
reasonable rental value by having a witness testify that
the water from the average run-off over a period of eight
years would amount to a definite number of gallons and
that multiplied by the price per gallon charged for culinary use by Salt Lake City and the result divided by
22% would give the reasonable rental value per share
per year for the water rights claimed by Mr. Moyle¥
Appellants question G: May the plaintiffs, Moyles,
use the culinary water through the pipes and all the irrigation water they used to maintain the growing of trees,
shrubs and grass on their premises and still recover the
full amount of the rental value of their water right¥
Appellants question H: May the plaintiffs recover
the reasonable rental value of the water right for the
years that the evidence conclusively shows there was no
interference with plaintiffs water right by Salt Lake
City~

And appellants other three questions may be asked
in any case. They are :

Appellants question A : Does the complaint state
sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action against
Salt Lake City~
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Appellants question F: ~[ay the Court take judicial knowledge of the fact that tlw \Yater flowing from
Big Cottonwood Canyon Creek untreated is fit for
culinary use~
Appellants question I: l\lay a judgment stand which
is not supported by the pleadings and the pleadings not
supported by the evidence? l\lay the judgment stand
where it atteinpts to order delivery of an incorporeal
right.~ ~lay a judgment order- the return of possession
of corporeal property when the evidence shows that the
property is not now in existence, that is at least under
anyone's control~

ARGUMENT
The first contention argued by appellant is that
plaintiffs complaint does not state a cause of action
against defendant. He sets out in the brief (p. 10) that
plaintiff alleges the taking of a water right and the
taking of the water to which the right attaches; the withholding of the possession thereof from plaintiffs by
defendant; the reasonable value of the use and possession
of such water during the withholding was a stated
amount and by reason of such withholding plaintiffs
were damaged in the amount of such reasonable value
of the use of the water; then defendant concluded his
statement by saying there is no allegation in the complaint of any damages sustained or suffered by plaintiffs.
This position seems to arise from a confusion that runs
throughout the brief. Counsel does not seem to consider
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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general damages as anything more than nominal damages. On his theory, a suit for conversion of a ton of
sugar, alleging the conversion of the sugar, the value of
the sugar at the time of the conversion and alleging the
damage in the amount -of the value (say $100.00) would
entitle the plaintiff to a judgment of only nominal
damages. On his theory plaintiff would have to allege
that he intended to make candy out of the sugar and
make other allegations to show a right to recover special
damages. This confusion runs throughout the whole
brief. At page 15 he says ''plaintiffs' counsel in open
court disclaimed any damages"; at page 24, "and their
attorney in open court disclaimed any damage for any
dimunition of water after 1926"; page 27, "they (the
plaintiffs) through their attorney, in open court, disclaimed any right to recover damages, claiming they
were not seeking damages and did not attempt to allege
or prove any damages"; page 27, the statement is repeated. By reading what actually took place in open
court it shows clearly that what counsel said was that
we were not claiming special damages to trees, shrubs,
lawns, vegetable garden and property-no where is it
intimated that we were not seeking the damages alleged
in the complaint. Plaintiffs spent nwst of their time at
the trial in testimony tending to prove their damage and
the amount thereof and defendant likewise called witness
after witness to testify to things that the defendant has
always (erroneously, we think) contended had a tendancy
to reduce the amount of plaintiffs' damage.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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There is no question but what a water appropriation
right depends upon beneficial use; and it is equally true
that if the appropriator fails to put the water to beneficial use and allows the water to run waste another may
use the ·water without doing any legal ·wrong to the appropriator. But it is equally true and equally well settled
that an appropriator of \Yater may maintain an action
for damages against one who obstructs, abstracts, or
diverts the water to vYhich plaintiff is entitled or other
wise interferes with his rights.
''An appropriator is entitled to have the full quantity of water called for by his appropriation flow in the
natural stream, or in his ditch or canal, in such way that
he can enjoy its use and for any material interference
with his flow of water, by which his right to its use is
substantially impaired, he may maintain an action for
damages.'' 3 Kinney on Irrigation and Water Rights,
p. 1662, p. 3054. Bailey v. Idaho Irr. Co., Limited (Idaho),
227 Pac. 1055 at p. 1056, second column. J errett v.
Mahan (Nev.), 17 Pac. 12.
There can be no doubt that at common law, and under
the code prescribing civil remedies, there would be a right
of action for damages for a wrongful interference with a
water right to the injury of the owner thereof. Van Buskirk v. Red Buttes Land and Live Stock Co. (vVyo.), 156
Pac. 1122 at 1126, bottom of second column.
Defendant's brief cites Parks Canal v. Mining. Co.,
G7 Cal. 44, and quotes the whole opinion. That case
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simply holds that the plaintiff therein could not bring
an action for the value of the water as f.or personal
property sold and delivered against one who, without his
consent, has diverted the stream above the mouth of his
ditch. No such question is involved in this case and no
such complaint is on file herein. The decision is probably
correct for one cannot ordinarily waive the tort in trespass and recover in an action of contract because no
promise can be implied. The taking of the water in the
case at bar was not a tort but was taken under an express
order of the court and whether the order for possession
was erroneous or not, the taking could not have been a
tort. .Assumpsit ·on a common count for goods sold and
delivered is an action sounding in contract and as heretofore stated cannot be brought for the value of property
taken by trespass, at least not taken in the manner the
water was taken, if at all, in the case of Parks Oanal v.
Hoyt, ante. That case counsel for the City probably
obtained from 67 Cor. Jur. 1053, Para. 507, where it is
specifically (and the only case cited) cited to the text that
an action for the value of the water, as personal property
sold and delivered, cannot be maintained against one who
has diverted the stream above the head of the appropriation ditch. The action of the plaintiffs in this case is
fully supported in 67 Cor. Jur. 1052, para. 505 .
.Appellant in its brief spends considerable time in
explaining how its complaint in its S'o-called condemnation case of Salt Lake City v. Moyle does not state a
cause of action. The Moyles interposed a general deSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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murrer to that complaint and that demurrer was sustained by the Court and thereafter on motion of the City
the rase was dismissed. So it is that on that ruling of the
trial court at least the appellant and respondent agree.
But because a complaint does not state a cause of action
does not oust the Court to proceed in the case and pronounce a Yalid judgment either correctly or erroneously.
Courts have jurisdiction to err as well as to f·ollow the
law. But appellant says that in the original complaint
there was no allegation of certain conditions precedent
to the bringing of conden1na tion proceeding to condemn
a water right. Assuming, but not conceding, that the
suit filed was a condemnati·on proceedings, it does not
follow that because conditions precedent to the filing
of the complaint were not alleged in the complaint that
therefore the Court would have no jurisdiction to proceed; the defendant could "\Yaive such allegations and
would do s·o by not raising the question and if raised
the Court would have jurisdiction to rule rightly or to
rule erroneously upon the question. Under a similar
statute to the Utah statute cited in appellants brief, the
Supreme Court of Wyoming, in the case of Edwards v.
Cheyenne, 114 Pac. 677, at p. 694, holds that it is not
necessary to allege the proper action by the City Council
and adds that perhaps they should be shown at the hearing. While the defendant in the condemnation proceeding may ·waive any such action by the City authoritier;
and may do so by failing to raise the que·stion the plaintiff is in no position to do it. It does not lie in his mouth
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to say the the Court has no jurisdiction over the particular proceedings that he has instituted.
''Jurisdiction of the person of the defendant
is not essential to the commencement of a suit.
But it is apparent that a suit is not commenced
until the court has in some manner acquired jurisdiction of something in relation to the controversy.
It must, therefore, be ·over the person of the plaintiff, or the subject matter, or both. The court acquires jurisdiction of the plaintiff when he applies
for its power and assistance to compel the defendant to render him his rights under the law;
but this aid must be sought according to prescribed forms, and under our practice that form
requires that he file with the clerk of the court a
praecipe for the process he desires. This is an
application, in its nature, to the court to send its
process to require the defendant to appear at a
subsequent term to defend the action. The Court
clearly has jurisdiction of the plaintiff when he
thus invokes its aid. When he thus submits his
person to the court, he, by asking its aid, gives
the court jurisdiction over the subject matter in
controversy, and confers power to adjudicate and
determine his rights- thus submitted. In this manner the court becomes possessed of jurisdiction of
the person of the plaintiff and of the subject
n1atter, and when so possessed it becomes the duty
of the court to commence and carry on the power
to bring the defendant in to the court, that the
case may be heard; and the rights of the parties
in the matter thus brought before the court may
be judicially and conclusively determined.''
Schroeder v. Merchants etc., Ins. Co., 104 Ill. 71 at
75. Ex parte Cohen, 6 Cal. 318.
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Jurisdiction of a particular action is acquired by the
filing of pleadings which show the case to he within the
general class of cases which the Court has jurisdiction
to hear and determine and a petition or complaint which
shows this is sufficient to gi,~e jurisdiction although it
is defective in other respects. A plain illustration of
this would be the exercise of the power of appointing a
receiver by the Court ·where the complaint alleged no
facts showing the necessity of such appointment; the
appointment would not be void and it could not be
attacked collaterally.
It is true that Justice Frick speaks of the action of
the City authorities as jurisdictional. In that case the
defendant, not the City, was claiming that the complaint
did not state a cause of action and he was so claiming
it in the condemnation proceedings. ''The owner whose
property is sought to be appropriated without his consent
certainly has the right to insist that the statute be followed. That is all Johnson is contending for on this
appeal." ).[r. Justice Frick in Tremonton v. Johnson,
49 Utah at p. 312. In this case at bar Salt Lake City is
attempting to attack collaterally an order of the Court on
account of a defect in their own complaint. 11r. Justice
Frick certainly used jurisdiction to mean nothing more
than it was necessary to state the action of the City authorities in the c01nplaint in order to state a cause of
action when the question was properly raised in the case
by proper objection on the part of the property owner;
that was all that was before the Court.
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It is argued by counsel under Assignment of Error
Nos. 2, 3 and 4 that the description of the water right in
plaip.tiffs complaint is misleading. It is, in our opinion,
strictly accurate. The right is a right to divert water
through the Tanner ·Ditch from the Big Cottonwood
stream; it -is not a right to divert water from the Tanner
Ditch. Neither the Tanner Ditch nor the Big Cottonwood
Tanner Ditch Company ever owned the right to divert
the water from the Big Cottonwood stream. Nor is the
position of counsel that there is no evidence of possession
of the water by Salt Lake City tenable. The City under
a showing of immediate possession procured from the
Court an order for such immediate possession in July,
1926. The evidence shows that April, May and June,
1926, the water in Big Cottonwood stream was clear
water; that in July, August, September and to October
15, 1926, the water available at the intake of the Tanner
Ditch was at least a mixture of Utah Lake water caused
by Salt Lake City pumping such water into Big Cotton
wood Stream. Abs. 139. That rendered the water of
the Tanner Ditch non-potable and was an actual taking
of the water of plaintiffs under the order of the Court.
The evidence also shows that at least part of that time
the entire flow of Big Cottonwood Creek was diverted at
the City conduit by Salt Lake City. The evidence we
think of the taking of possession of the water by Salt
Lake City is quite conclusive. The order of the Court
was for immediate possession because of the necessities
of Salt Lake City and the City had all the means necessary to take the water. It did take all the water of the
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stream at times in 1926 and took it admittedly by polluting the water in July, August and September and
October 1926. There is no evidence that the City ever
returned the water to the plaintiffs. Although the City
put on a witness, the as sis tan t City Engineer in charge
of water supply, and especially in charge of the exchange
contract on the Big Cottonwood stream, not a word came
from him to show that the City did not immediately take
possession of the water and had not kept the possession
of the water until the time of the trial.
''The right to own property carries with it
the right to exercise dominion and control over it.
'Vhen the dominion control and management of
one's property is taken away from him, the right
to private property is violated. To take away the
dominion and control over property is to take the
property itself, for the absolute right to property
includes the right of dominion, control, and the
management thereof." Fisher v. Bountiful City,
21 u. 29.
The Court in this case further said at page 35:
"The domini·on and right to the use of the
water and the control and diversion of the same
for irrigation, culinary and other beneficial purposes, was vested in the plaintiffs' by their appropriation and use, and they could not be deprived
of such right except by their voluntary act, by forfeiture, or by operation of law.''
Under Assignments Nos. 5 and 6, appellant contends
that plaintiffs proved no damage. In our complaint we
alleged the reasonable value of the use and possession
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of the water during the time the water was taken from
plaintiffs and alleged plaintiffs' damages in the amount
of that reasonable value. The testimony of Mr. Moyle
was that the reasonable rental value of that water at the
time and in the vicinity of his property was $15.00 per
share per annum for the whole time involved. This was
the lowest value put on that water by any witness qualified to testify as to its value. Mr. Moyle qualified to
testify on the subject of value and there is a presumption
that the owner of property knows its sale and rental
value. The testimony of Mr. :Moyle on direct examination as abstracted (Abs. 37 and 38) is somewhat uncertain
and in order to determine his true testimony in this regard, it is necessary to refer to the Transcript, Pages
80 to 83.
M. R. Weiler, a resident of the immediate vicinity
of the Moyle property and a man educated as an engineer,
well acquainted with Big Cottonwood stream in its
natural condition at that place, and one who had been
in the market for culinary water in the vicinity of his
home and of the Moyle premises, and with the amount of
such water that would come to the Moyles place by reason
of the 22%= shares owned by the M'Oyles outside the Corporation, testified that fifty dollars per share per annum
would be a conservative valuation for the use of that
water. (Abs. 59-61, Trans. 123, 124.)
On cross examination Mr. Moyle testified that in
his judgment the shares were worth $800.00 per share.
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tiffs over this water in question before the State Engineer
of Utah, that official found among his findings that Big
Cottonwood stream water had a value at Moyles place
and in that vicinity, of ten times as much as Utah Lake
water pumped by Salt Lake City to the Tanner Ditch
intake. That finding was a proper one to he found by
the State Engineer in that controversy, was made in
the course of his official duties and no one can doubt the
qualifications of the State Engineer to determine that
value. See Exh. E. It should carry great weight with
any tribunal that was called upon to determine the value
of water at that place. Had it been found by the Court
in a controversy submitted to it the finding would have
been res judicata. We do not claim it to be so because
the finding was not made by a judicial tribunal; but we
do claim that it is evidence of a very high order and
entitled to great weight. On that valuation the rental
value placed by Mr. Weiler would provide a very low
rental return on the value determined by the State
Engineer. It is true that the trial court said that he
did not think that the finding of the State Engineer vvas
competent evidence of value. On what theory it is not
we do not know. The finding is in evidence for other
purposes and we think has great weight on the question
of value.
On the defendant's part witnesses from far down
on the Tanner Ditch were sworn and testified as to the
value of water for irrigation purposes and that Utah
Lake water was as valuable as Cottonwood water for
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farm irrigation. We submit that each and every witness
for defendant faHed to qualify as a witness as to the
rental value of the 223)~, shares in question. They knew
nothing about values except as to the value of Tanner
Ditch corporate stock and its rental value. Even the
witness Towler, the assistant City Engineer, testified:" I
am perfectly frank to say that I based the rental value
on the use to which Mr. Moyle had put the water there."
That was, he testified, to irrigation use on the Moyle
property. Trans. p. 301. Probably every eminent domain case tried contains an instruction to the general
effect that the owner is entitled to the property's actual
value for its highest or best use to which the property
could be put at the time of the taking. And a witness's
testimony on value where he excluded uses of a more
valuable nature that the property could be put to at the
time of the taking is of little or no value to aid court
or jury to determine what is just compensation for the
property. There is nothing in the record to justify the
statement that Mr. Weiler, a witness for the plaintiffs,
calculated his value of the l\Ioyle water by determining
the number of gallons it would yield per annum and
multiplying the amount by the price per gallon Salt
Lake City charges for water delivered through its pipe
line. Neither did any other witness in the case. So we
say that the question as to whether that is a correct way
of ascertaining the reasonable value of the use and possession of the water in question is not in the case before
the Court. But certain it is that a witness would not be
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disqualified from testifying on the value simply because
he knew at what price the City was charging for culinary
water in that vicinity. Supposing that the City was
selling its water through the pipe line at a price that
would enable the plaintiffs to procure from the City
through its pipe line an amount of water equal to that
amount of culinary water that one share of the water
in question would produce in a year at a charge of five
dollars per annum; would the City be here arguing that
that fact was immateriaH Hardly; this suit would have
been settled long ago if that were a fact.
The appellant complains because the trial court did
not take into consideration any beneficial use that the
plaintiffs received for the culinary water furnished
through the pipe line or the Lake water furnished through
the Tanner Ditch. The argument is not naive and we
must recall some facts. In addition to the 22% shares of
water in question, the Moyles' were the owners during all
the time since July, 1926 (and for some time before) of
more than 23 shares of the stock of the Big Cottonwood
Tanner Ditch Company. This corporate stock furnished
the ~[oyles with ample culinary water for their home and
also ·with all the Tanner Ditch water that they used on
their land. They cut down at once the amount of ground
cultivated upon the entering of the order of the Court for
immediate possession of their water right. Abs. 32-3
and 56. :Mr. l\[oyle says that he was very careful not
to use water other than that_ alloted to him on his corporate stock. He knew that the order of the Court was
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that the City was to have immediate possession of his
water in Big Cottonwood stream and that the City was to
make available to him Lake water in the Tanner Ditch
and some culinary water in its pipe line; that is that the
suit was to compel a trade in accordance with the contract
with Tanner Ditch corporation. Mr. Moyle was not
willing to agree to this and was opposed to entering into
any such agreement. He knew, that if he accepted the
terms of the proposed agreement he would be in no position to resist the claims of the City that he should be
compelled by the Court to accept those terms. And so
it was that he was very careful not to use any of the
water that the City claims was available for him. He
was not compelled to accept those terms and was not
compelled to minimize any damages he might suffer by
reason of the taking of the City. There is no question
of minimizing the damages in this case because we are
not asking for special damages but only for general
damages.
Counsel says that Mr. Moyle was not entitled to any
water rights during the non-irrigation season because
he had ample culinary water through the City's pipe line.
Just how that follows, the writer is not able to see. The
water, the entire amount, was decreed to him during the
entire year. Para. 7, p. 107 Abs. And Mr. Moyle testified that he so U'3ed it until deprived of the possession
of it by the City under the order of the Court. Abs. 29.
The City in its brief contends that the action is
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barred by some statute of limitations; a sufficient answer
to that is that the City frmn 1926 until the time of trial
continued to take and possess the water belonging to
plaintiffs under circumstances that renders the City liable
for its reasonable rental value as damages for the loss
of the use of the water by the plaintiffs. The right to
bring an action for such damages existed at common law
and does not rest upon any statute of the State. Out of
abundance of caution, plaintiffs presented a claim to the
City for a wrong then continuing to exist, not for one
that had ceased to exist at some prior time, and then
brought their action for that same wrong still continuing
at the time of the filing of the action; and the testimony
shows the wrong to still continue at the time of the trial.
The right to bring the action at bar is not statutory but
always has existed. The citation of Ilurley v. Bingham,
63 Utah 589, cited by appellant, was an action for personal injuries and purely statutory.
The argument that plaintiffs had abandoned any
part of their \Vater right for any part of the year is not
borne out by the evidence in the record, and the State
Engineer, in the controversy instituted before that
officer against the Moyles heretofore referred to, found
that there had been no such abandonment. ·
Appellant's contention that the order of possession
fixing what the City should do to reimburse Moyle for the
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able. Courts do not make contracts for parties nor
determine the damages in the absence of any action being
brought to determine such damages.
The contention that plaintiffs have been benefitted
by the action of the City in beneficently bringing Utah
Lake water to their place to exchange it for Big Cottonwood water is pure fiction; and even if it were true, the
City has no right to force its benefactions upon its own
residents to say nothing of the City trying to do it upon
communities far beyond its boundaries.
The plaintiffs were in possession of a water right in
Big Cottonwood stream and defendant, being, as it asserted, in sore need of that water right for the health and
necessities of Salt Lake City inhabitants brought a special proceedings to compel the plaintiffs to exchange that
water right for certain amounts of Utah Lake water and
a limited amount of culinary water from the City's pipe
line. On such a complaint Salt Lake City procured an
order of the Court for the immediate possession of that
water right from the plaintiffs in this action. The City,
so the evidence amply shows, took possession of all the
water in the Big Cottonwood stream for long periods of
time, leaving none of it to go down to the plaintiffs herein
and put into said stream bed Utah Lake water, a very
different and inferior quality of water. After many
years the City had the special proceeding dismissed but
has not yet returned the use of the water to these plaintiffs. This action was brought to recover the value of
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the use of such water to taken and withheld by the City
and for the return of that water to the plaintiffs for their
use and benefit. In our opinion plaintiffs introduced
competent and satisfactory evidence of the taking, the
reasonable rental Yalue of that water during the withholding of it by the City from the plaintiffs and of every
fact alleged in the complaint and of every fact in the trial
court's findings. The evidence would have justified a
much larger judgment but the plaintiffs felt that they
were bound by the amount asked in their claim filed
with the defendant, Salt Lake City. The City can at any
time return that water but they seem to prefer to keep
possession and risk the outcome of litigation. The evidence and the law fully supports the judgment rendered
by the trial court and we submit that the judgment
should be affirmed in all particulars.
Respectfully submitted,
T. D. Lewis,
David T. Lewis,
0. W. Moyle Jr.,
Dan T. :Moyle,
Attorneys for Respondents.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

